A surprising amount of HR advice, including plenty of informal guidance circulating in HR forums, treats “we have proof” as the same thing as “we can terminate immediately.” Under Indian labour law, it usually isn’t. Even where the misconduct is real and well documented, skipping the procedural steps is the single biggest reason a termination gets reversed by a labour court, reinstating an employee whose conduct was never actually in dispute. This guide covers what the process actually requires, and the real exceptions to it.
It’s worth being precise about this distinction before anything else, since it’s a common source of confusion. Layoff and retrenchment are both no-fault separations, driven by the employer’s inability to provide work or a genuine reduction in workforce, and carry their own statutory compensation formulas. Misconduct termination is fault-based, tied to a specific act by the employee such as theft, fraud, insubordination or violence, and it runs on an entirely different legal track: due process through a domestic inquiry rather than a compensation formula.
The core procedural requirement comes from a combination of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and decades of case law built around natural justice under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There is no single “how-to” statute; the process below is drawn from consistent judicial doctrine, not one section of one law.
Natural justice in this context rests on three principles: the rule against bias (the person deciding can’t also be the person who investigated or accused), audi alteram parte (the accused has a genuine right to be heard), and a reasoned decision (the outcome has to follow logically from the evidence presented, not be predetermined).
Probationary employees. A domestic inquiry isn’t automatically required to end a probation. But if the actual basis for ending it is misconduct rather than ordinary non-confirmation, courts (a Calcutta High Court ruling is a clear example) have held that framing matters: a probation termination that’s genuinely punitive in substance, even if labelled otherwise, still needs a proper inquiry.
The “loss of confidence” doctrine. The Supreme Court, in cases including Air India v. Rebellow and Torrent Power v. Luhar, has allowed employers to discharge an employee for loss of confidence without a full disciplinary inquiry, where the underlying facts are already on record. This is a real, narrow exception, not a general license: the decision has to be bona fide, and the employer can still be required to justify it later if challenged before a labour court or tribunal. Don’t treat this as a routine way to skip the inquiry process; it’s an exception courts apply carefully.
Termination during the notice period. Terminating during notice isn’t automatically exempt from due process either. If misconduct is the stated reason, the inquiry requirement still applies. A no-reason termination with notice pay in lieu is a different, cleaner path, but only where misconduct genuinely isn’t the operative reason.
Where the employee is a statutory “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act, a defective or skipped inquiry is one of the most reliable ways to lose at a labour court, with reinstatement and back wages a realistic outcome even where the underlying misconduct was real. For non-workmen, the exposure looks different, more likely breach-of-contract or defamation risk than reinstatement, but it’s still real exposure, not a reason to treat process casually.
In force since 21 November 2025, the Code makes a few concrete procedural changes rather than replacing the underlying natural-justice doctrine, which remains intact:
Strong evidence changes the likely outcome of a properly run inquiry, but it doesn’t remove the requirement to run one. Skipping the process is still the most common reason even well-evidenced terminations get overturned.
There’s no single fixed timeline in the older framework, though the new 90-day cap on the investigation phase where suspension is involved gives a practical outer bound worth working within.
The natural-justice case law underlying the domestic inquiry process applies independently of whether an employer has a certified Standing Order, so yes, the core steps are still the safer path even below the 300-worker threshold.
Suspension is a temporary measure while the inquiry is ongoing, with the employee still on the books and entitled to a subsistence allowance. Termination is the final outcome, decided only after the inquiry concludes.
Practice varies by organisation and by any applicable Standing Order, but denying representation where policy or precedent allows it is a common ground for challenging the fairness of the process afterward.
For related exit-process detail, see our guides on absence management and absconding and what belongs in an employee handbook.